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A Hybrid Firm’s Pricing Strategy in Electronic 
Commerce Under Channel Migration
Robert J. Kauffman, Dongwon Lee, Jung Lee, and Byungjoon Yoo
ABSTRACT: Achieving an effective business design across the Internet and the off-line 
channel is a critical concern for a hybrid firm’s choice of pricing strategy. Two pricing 
models are proposed to examine how consumer channel migration (one-way channel 
interaction from the traditional sales channel to the Internet) affects pricing strategy. One 
model has no interaction between the Internet and off-line channels. The other includes 
the possibility of one-way migration to the Internet channel and incorporates consumers’ 
channel-switching costs and loyalty to the firm. The two models offer interesting results 
for understanding traditional and Internet-based selling. A high level of channel migration 
leads a firm to manage the two channels as one. With low channel migration, in contrast, 
the firm should optimize and manage each channel separately. The models had two main 
findings: (1) the level of channel migration determines a hybrid firm’s pricing strategy; (2) a 
hybrid firm’s price-level choice should be determined by the on-line demand proportion 
of its business. The modeling results were validated with empirical analysis for 10 large 
South Korean e-commerce firms by comparing prices in different product categories for 
various types of hybrid firms and Internet-only firms. This research offers new marketing 
strategy insights for managers of hybrid firms who wish to optimize price-setting deci-
sions based on interactions between distribution channels and the intensity of the firm’s 
involvement in the on-line channel.
Key WORdS And phRASeS: Business policy, channel migration, channel-switching 
costs, e-commerce, empirical research, hybrid firm, loyalty, marketing, on-line channel, 
pricing models, pricing strategy.
Pure Internet firms, such as Amazon.com and Buy.com, built successful 
e-commerce businesses in the retailing industry during the 1995 to 2000 
period [54]. Pastore reports that 9 of the top 10 Internet-retailing sites in 1999 
were Internet-only firms [70]. (See Appendix Table A1.) At that time, large 
traditional retailers such as Wal-Mart and Best Buy were not yet motivated 
to extend their business channels to the Internet, although they could have 
achieved competitive advantage in the Internet-retailing industry. To do this, 
they would have needed to utilize their accumulated business knowledge in 
terms of economies of scale, brand power, marketing channel integration and 
customer-relationship management [80].
The lack of early entry in the digital market was partly due to the low busi-
ness flexibility of the large traditional retailers. Since the e-commerce industry 
was growing and changing rapidly, requiring different business models, the 
extent of available business flexibility was a necessary operational capability 
for the firms [34]. Young Internet-only firms like Amazon.com had compara-
tively higher business flexibility, which enabled them to achieve a better match 
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with the Internet compared to the traditional channels of commerce in terms 
of virtual inventory and systems integration capabilities [40, 63].
Another reason for the slow adoption of the Internet channel was the profit 
uncertainty of business on the Internet. The wider reach of e-commerce drove 
fierce price competition among e-commerce firms, and low transaction costs 
and entry barriers on the Internet even accelerated it [5, 15]. To survive, e-com-
merce firms lowered their prices to the marginal cost to attract consumers. At 
Amazon.com, for example, bestsellers were sold at 30 to 40 percent discounts, 
and books in other categories at a 10 percent discount [45]. Buy.com offered a 
low-price guarantee for most of its products, and in many cases sold products 
below cost [88]. Large market shares in the e-commerce industry, however, 
did not guarantee large profits, and low prices and strong competition on the 
Internet finally caused on-line retailers to achieve no better than low profit-
ability [27, 30]. According to Amazon.com’s 10-K report in 2004, for example, 
its annualized deficits in 1999 and 2000 were $720 million and $1,411 million, 
respectively, and such losses continued until 2002 [20]. But according to the 
founder of Amazon.com, its losses occurred due to continued and heavy ex-
pansion. If Amazon.com had not had such aggressive investment, however, 
it could have advanced the date of the first profit.
After the dot-com bubble crash in 2000, though, large traditional retailing 
firms (e.g., Wal-Mart, Sears, and JCPenney) expanded their presence for retail-
ing in the Internet channel. (Compare the leftmost and rightmost columns in 
Appendix Table A1.) For traditional retailers, entering the Internet channel was 
not a simple decision, though. The Internet is rapidly growing and provides 
new business opportunity for Internet-only retailers, but it is still a high-risk 
investment for traditional retailers [33].
The period since the latter part of the 1990s has seen the emergence of hybrid 
firms that blend use of the traditional channel and the Internet channel, and 
offer potential for growth in the e-commerce sector [34]. But in practice, the 
channel expansion brings several business problems in pricing. For example, 
should a hybrid firm charge the same price in the on-line channel as in its 
traditional stores? Or should it charge a lower price in the on-line channel? If 
the hybrid firm charges the same price in both channels, a practice known as 
unified pricing, it may struggle in the e-commerce industry because Internet-
only firms usually charge lower prices than traditional stores [1, 15]. On the 
other hand, if the hybrid firm charges a lower price in its on-line channel to 
compete with Internet-only retailers, a practice known as channel pricing, it may 
not generate enough profit and may even suffer from channel cannibalization 
[32, 73]. Moreover, inconsistent pricing strategies across channels may cause 
confusion to consumers [10, 34].
Channel management thus is considered an important strategic issue for 
hybrid firms. The strategic closeness of the channels, or the degree of channel 
interaction, is of high interest [8, 60, 72]. Previous research suggests that channel 
interaction (i.e., consumers moving back and forth across different distribution 
channels) has been one of the basic assumptions or the consequence of other 
issues, and not the main focus of investigation. Channel interaction has been 
treated as a given or resulted from the interplay of various factors character-
izing a situation. In this paper, the focus is more on how the hybrid firm should 
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strategically integrate its pricing for the off-line and on-line channels when it is 
possible for consumers to move in one direction: from the traditional distribu-
tion channel to the Internet. This kind of channel interaction will be referred 
to hereinafter as channel migration, to distinguish it from other settings where 
consumers are able to move back and forth across the channels [2].
Few research efforts have examined the degree to which channel interactions 
occur, although this kind of analysis has mostly been used to determine the 
basic structure of the hybrid firm at the macro level. If the two channels are 
viewed by a firm as completely separate, then the firm’s actions will be more 
like those of two firms that have separate pricing strategies. If the two channels 
are treated as “close” to one another and pricing strategies are linked, then 
the firm will face a more complex decision-making process. Most previous 
studies investigated multichannel firms at a more micro level. For example, 
some studies focus on consumer behavior and preferences within a firm [48, 
50, 72]. Others emphasize the related managerial problems from the perspec-
tive of customer relationships [65, 81].
Throughout this article, the discussion shows how the results are different 
from the predictions made by the theory of price discrimination. The theory ex-
plains how a firm can maximize its profit by charging different prices to differ-
ent customers. Because a number of studies recommend that firms should use 
price discrimination on the Internet [7, 67], the present research shows results 
that are counter-intuitive to what is suggested by the conventional theory. 
Literature Review
The importance of channel interaction in the hybrid firm is recognized in two 
streams of literature, one on strategic channel management, the other on multichan-
nel pricing. A review of the relevant literature will be preceded by a discussion 
of the current practices of hybrid e-commerce firms in the United States.
Hybrid Firm Pricing Strategies
Over time, more and more customers have become multichannel shoppers. 
Boa, for example, reported that more than 60 percent of customers want to use 
multiple channels in making purchases [13]. According to a Forrester Research 
study, 140 million consumers, almost 50 percent of the total U.S. population, 
had already incorporated the Internet into their shopping habits, based on their 
searching and buying activities, or both, in 2005 [56]. Mendelsohn, Johnson, 
and Meyr further reported that 54 percent of on-line consumers had researched 
a product on-line and purchased it off-line, and another 37 percent had re-
searched off-line and purchased on-line in 2005 [55]. The large proportion of 
multichannel shoppers indicates the high level of interactions between the 
different consumer distribution channels that seem to be present in the U.S. 
Internet retailing market and are likely to be occurring elsewhere.
Generally speaking, hybrid firms do not seem to be consistently using the 
unified-pricing strategy across different channels due to operational problems. 
14     Kauffman, LEE, LEE, anD Yoo
In the United States, for example, QVC.com, a well-known hybrid TV home-
shopping and Internet retailer, has been using a unified-pricing strategy for 
the most part over time, and the firm is well known for emphasizing customer 
service to a greater extent than prices (although it aims to price on the low side 
of the marketplace) [57]. During the first few years of the 2000s, the word on 
the street was that it was hard for Wal-Mart and Walmart.com to implement 
identical prices in their physical stores and on the Internet. It was operation-
ally difficult because the firm had approximately 600,000 different product 
stock-keeping units (SKUs) at the time [35]. These days, Walmart.com does 
not explicitly confirm that its on-line prices are the same as its off-line prices, 
although it is consistent in communicating to the market that all its prices are 
founded on the strategic model of being the low-price retailer in the channels 
in which it operates [39]. Practically speaking, though, it is impossible to have 
a pure unified-pricing strategy because prices are different even among off-line 
Wal-Mart stores due to the different tax systems they face in different states.
As a result, the larger off-line retailers seem to have been putting greater 
effort into price matching. For example, Sears and Best Buy have mostly 
adopted the policy of matching across different channels to ensure that their 
customers pay the lowest prices available both off-line and on-line [11, 75]. 
Even though it is not easy to perfectly match prices across channels, hybrid 
firms are apparently aware of the importance of price consistency and are 
doing their best to integrate their channels to implement a largely unified-
pricing strategy [12]. This is probably true up to the firm’s operational and 
cost-of-doing-business limits. For example, Sears states explicitly in its descrip-
tion of its pricing policy that price matching does not apply to its operations 
in Alaska or Hawaii, where local costs of doing business and high product 
transportation costs may make it impossible for the firm to achieve uniform 
profitability in different locations and on the Internet [75]. Another general 
issue that will influence a firm’s ability to match prices comes with different 
state-level tax rates, and the fact that Internet-based purchases may or may 
not be taxed, depending on the locations of the seller and the buyer. With the 
price-matching strategies observed among large American firms, the trend 
for hybrid firms now seems to be toward channel integration, as Gulati and 
Garino have observed [34]. The purpose is to provide a consistent customer 
experience across channels [63].
Strategic Channel Management
Previous studies related to strategic channel management investigated the 
causes of channel interaction at the consumer level or the resulting strategies 
for channel interaction at the firm level (see table 1). For example, Merrilees 
and Fenech discussed the key motivating factors of purchases in the on-line 
channel and the traditional catalog channel [58]. They reported the causes 
of channel interactions that make consumers move from one channel to the 
other: Web experience, information search, trust, ease of use, and accuracy. 
Similarly, Montoya-Weiss, Voss, and Grewal found that Web site design is a 
channel-selection factor [60]. In addition, Laukkanen showed that consumers 
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exhibit differences in the mobile and Internet channels that help to explain 
why some consumers stay in their selected channel while others switch from 
one channel to another [50].
Kumar and Venkatesan developed a conceptual framework to identify 
consumer-level characteristics associated with purchasing behaviors across 
multiple channels [48]. They reported that communication between channels 
generates the synergic effect in multichannel shopping. The scope of their 
research spanned identification of the factors and the synergic consequences 
of channel interaction. Bendoly et al. pointed out the importance of the trend 
toward channel integration, when firms unify product prices across multiple 
distribution channels [8]. The extent of channel integration that is built into a 
business is a firm-level decision, as well as the rationale for making it trans-
parent to consumers.
Channel integration is an organizational-level decision-making issue that 
has the potential to provide a basis for strategic advantage and heighten firm 
competitiveness. Payne and Frow suggested that customer-relationship man-
agement (CRM) strategies support effective channel-management strategies 
[72]. In addition, Steinfield, Bouwman, and Adelaar analyzed the synergistic 
aspects of channel integration as the outcomes of different degrees of interac-
tion between channels [80]. Similarly, Deleersnydera et al. validated another 
important finding: that the synergic effect of channel integration is larger than 
its cannibalistic effects on sales [24]. However, Müller-Lankenau et al. use the 
terms channel alignment and integration interchangeably and suggest that there 
is no single best approach in multichannel retailing [62].
Pricing Strategies in Different Channels
Multichannel pricing research has two main branches based on the structure of 
competition that is assumed or occurs. If channel competition occurs between 
firms, then it is firm-vs.-firm competition. If competition occurs across channels 
within a multichannel firm, it will be referred to here as channel-vs.-channel 
competition. Multichannel firms should not just maximize profit in the separate 
channels but should consider the potential for sales cannibalization across 
channels and the resulting beneficial synergies.
From the firm-vs.-firm competition perspective, most studies focus on price 
comparisons between the on-line and off-line channels. There is a preconcep-
tion that on-line prices are lower than off-line prices, and some early studies 
discuss the reliability of these perceptions on the part of consumers [4, 15, 
61]. In addition to these largely empirical investigations, other authors have 
also used analytical modeling approaches in their research. Bakos et al. set 
up a model to analyze bundling strategies for products and services in on-
line brokerage [5]. Zettelmeyer argued that low Internet prices are due to the 
relatively narrow reach of the Internet [89].
Not much research has been done on channel-vs.-channel competition 
relative to price-setting by multichannel firms. Exploratory research on cross-
channel pricing opportunities for firms has been conducted by Sotgiu and 
Ancarani [77]. Some other studies compare the prices of Internet-only firms 
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and hybrid firms as a means to reveal the structure of cross-channel competi-
tion that occurs within a firm [1, 69]. They have consistently concluded that 
hybrid firms set higher prices than Internet-only firms, but do not provide any 
in-depth reasoning or theoretical explanations for their results. Other issues in 
channel-pricing competition within a firm have been examined by Ghose et 
al. in reference to the book industry, especially the cross-price elasticity of new 
and used books [31], and by Weng, who considered the impact of joint pricing 
decisions on the hybrid firm’s channel coordination [87]. Table 2 presents a 
summary of previous studies on multichannel pricing strategies.
Previous studies often employ a basic assumption that there is some level 
of interaction between channels. Among the various studies, some investigate 
its causes at the consumer level. Others propose strategies toward channel 
integration at the organizational level to develop a channel management 
perspective, or else they find an optimal pricing structure across channels to 
support profit maximization. One limitation of these studies is that they do not 
explore the extent to which channel interaction occurs. They more or less treat 
interactions between consumer distribution channels as a given. This paper 
will investigate the extent of the impacts of one-way channel migration from 
the traditional channel to the Internet channel—an instance of more general 
channel interactions—at the firm level. More specifically, strategic pricing 
policies will be derived that optimize profitability as a new means to provide 
guidance on the hybrid firm’s channel-management policy.
Pricing Models for the Hybrid Firm
As noted earlier, the model assumes one-directional movement or channel 
migration from the traditional channel to the Internet channel. This is due 
to a key assumption made in the present research: that consumers will have 
lower reservation prices in the electronic channel. Two types of pricing mod-
els are presented: one with no channel migration, and the other with channel 
migration. The broader term, channel interaction, typically refers to demand 
changes that occur due to consumers’ use of multiple distribution channels for 
purchasing the same products [72]. Channel interaction is generally concep-
tualized with the assumption of bi-directional movement of customers [72]. 
Channel cannibalization occurs in such contexts when channel interaction or 
channel migration results in a decrease of total demand for the hybrid firm’s 
products [73]. Reservation price is defined as the maximum price a customer 
is willing to pay for a sale item.
No channel migration means that consumers will stay within the traditional 
channel. The implication is that there will not be any cross-channel demand 
shifts in the normal course of business. Assuming some level of channel 
migration permits consumers to be multichannel shoppers who make utility-
maximizing choices between the on-line and off-line channels based on their 
heterogeneous preferences and incentives. Demand within each channel will 
vary in the presence of repeat business. One expects that the presence of a 
large number of multichannel shoppers will affect the level of demand in 
each channel.
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The next section presents a model with fixed demand that assumes no 
channel migration. After this, the fixed demand assumption will be freed up 
in an extended model with flexible demand and channel migration. These two 
models generate different results, and their implications will be compared 
and discussed.
Base Case Pricing Model: Rigid Demand with No Channel 
Migration
Consider a large, off-line monopoly retailer that recently has been expanding 
its retailing channel onto the Internet and therefore might now be regarded 
as a hybrid firm. The rationale for the monopoly assumption, in addition to 
providing a base case for achieving tractable analytical results, is that it is 
intended to capture the essence of what happens when large, famous off-line 
firms with strong consumer followings enter the on-line channel. Examples 
include L.L.Bean, REI, and Lands’ End. These large and famous off-line re-
tailers usually have a degree of monopoly power relative to their customers 
because of the perceived uniqueness of what they do (e.g., L.L.Bean for its 
suburban New England clothing designs, REI for its outdoor sports equipment 
and co-op discounts, Lands’ End for its high-quality clothing sales catalog 
operations). Since the hybrid firm in the model has a high-enough operational 
capacity in its business to be able to expand its channels of distribution, one 
can reasonably assume that it has a certain level of monopoly power relative 
to its customers.
The formal development of the model now begins. (By convention, the 
subscript e will represent the on-line, or electronic, channel and the subscript t 
the traditional channel. See Appendix Table A2 for a summary of all modeling 
notation used in this article.) Let k be the proportion of potential demand that 
arises for the firm in the on-line channel compared to the traditional channel, 
which is less than the demand from the traditional channel (i.e., k < 1). (The 
parameter k also can be interpreted as the proportion of consumers who prefer 
the on-line channel over the traditional channel.) Potential demand is defined 
as the demand that would occur if the price were zero. This assumption is 
natural for new entrants to the Internet channel, where there is a history of past 
traditional retailing business. This assumption is corroborated in general terms 
by empirical evidence from several reports on the percentage of e-commerce 
sector activities relative to total retailing activities. For example, according to 
the U.S. Census Bureau, e-commerce amounted to a little less than 2.5 percent 
of total retail revenues in the U.S. economy in 2005 [83]. Also, the portion of 
e-commerce is smaller than other traditional business channels, such as mail 
order or catalog. According to IBISWorld’s Mail-Order U.S. Industry Report, 
the total revenue of the mail order industry in 2005 was $124.5 billion, while 
the e-commerce industry’s total was $86.3 billion [37]. Even though e-commerce 
sector revenues increased by 7.2 percent (± 0.3 percent) from 2004, the tra-
ditional mail order channel is still larger than the on-line channel by almost 
50 percent. So the on-line market is still smaller than the traditional retailing 
market, although it has been growing fast.
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The reservation price Re used in the on-line channel is lower than the one in 
the traditional channel, Rt (i.e., Re < Rt). Consumers tend to believe that on-line 
prices are lower than off-line prices, inclusive of shipping and handling costs. 
Forrester Research surveys in 2004 and 2006 showed that more than 70 percent 
of consumers thought prices were lower on-line [38]. In addition, Shop.org and 
Forrester Research reported that nearly three-quarters of consumers expected 
on-line channels to provide lower prices [28]. A number of studies have also 
provided empirical and analytical evidence that prices are lower in the on-line 
channel than in off-line channels, as discussed earlier [1, 5, 15, 61]. As each 
channel has a downward-sloping demand curve, the demand levels of the 
off-line and on-line channels can be represented as in Equation (1).
Traditional and On-Line Channel Demand 
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Dt and De are the potential demand levels, pt and pe represent retail prices, 
and dt and de represent the demand levels at price pt and pe, respectively, of 
the traditional and on-line channels (see figure 1).
Next, estimating the total demand, we solve for the equilibrium prices of 
the hybrid firm. The hybrid firm’s total demand dh at price ph is the sum of 
the traditional and on-line channel demand levels, because it is assumed that 
there is no channel migration. This makes it possible to derive a hybrid firm’s 
total demand as:
The Hybrid Firm’s Total Demand 
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Figure 2 illustrates the demand curve of the hybrid firm.
The solid line represents the hybrid firm’s demand curve. At each price 
level, total demand is the sum of the demand levels that occur separately in 
the traditional and on-line channels. If the hybrid firm charges a price between 
Re and Rt, then demand will occur only in the traditional channel. If the price 
is between 0 and Re , however, then demand will occur in both channels. For 
example, if the firm charges ph, as shown in Figure 2, total demand will be dh, 
which is the sum of de and dt (i.e., dh = de + dt). de is the demand that will occur 
in the on-line channel with price ph, and dt is the level of demand occurring 
in the traditional channel with price ph. As argued above, the hybrid firm will 
have two pricing strategy alternatives. One is to charge the same price in both 
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channels, a unified-pricing strategy. The other is to charge different prices based 
on the channel, a channel-pricing strategy.
It is now necessary to see which pricing strategy is the best for the hybrid 
firm. In settings of this sort, it is common for there to be fixed costs associated 
with selling (e.g., based on the requirements of participation in a channel—a 
store, a Web site, promotion and advertising) and variable costs associated with 
the volume of sales (labor to support the transaction, cost of goods sold, etc.). 
For simplicity in the analysis and without loss of generality, it is assumed 
that there are no fixed costs or variable costs. Total profit is a linear function 
of total sales in the model. A profit parameter will be used only for compari-
son purposes, so assuming specific fixed and variable costs will not change 
the main results obtained. For these cases, the equilibrium prices and profits 
are represented in Figure 3 and Table 3. In these equations, ph* and p*h_u are 
the equilibrium price and profit of the unified-pricing hybrid firm, and pt*, 
pe*, and p*h_c are the equilibrium prices and total profit of the channel-pricing 
hybrid firm. To provide evidence that this is a reasonable simplification that 
does not introduce other, unintended circumstances, a model was analyzed 
with both fixed and variables costs. The corroborating evidence is presented 
Figure 1. Demand Curves for Traditional and Online Channels
Figure 2. Demand Curve for the Hybrid Firm
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in Appendix Table A2. The same results were obtained as compared to the 
model without these costs.
Equation (2) shows the case when the firm has no incentive to extend the 
traditional channel to the Internet. If the proportion of total demand from the 
on-line channel is small, then it will be inappropriate for a potential hybrid 
firm to extend its business to the Internet. The firm will not be able to maximize 
profit this way, as the usual business intuition might suggest. Equations 3.1, 
3.2, and 4 are presented in Table 3.
If the hybrid firm adopts a channel-pricing strategy, pt* and pe* will be 
the associated equilibrium prices for each channel, permitting prices to be 
optimized based on the demand in each channel. If the hybrid firm adopts a 
unified-pricing strategy, though, the price ph* will be optimized based on the 
total demand of the hybrid firm. The optimal price would occur between pe* 
and pt*. This is a little lower than pt* but a little higher than pe*. Moreover, if 
the profits from the two pricing strategies are compared, the channel-pricing 
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Figure 3. The Hybrid Firm’s Optimal Price and Profit Under Different 
Pricing Strategies
Table 3. Equilibrium Prices and Profits Under Different Pricing Strategy 
Assumptions, Base Case.
IntERnatIonaL JouRnaL of ELECtRonIC CommERCE     23
strategy (i.e., different prices in each channel) shows higher profits than the 
unified-pricing strategy (i.e., the same prices across the two channels). So, for 
the base case model, one may conclude that the channel-pricing strategy is op-
timal for the hybrid firm. Thus, the following first proposition is suggested:
Proposition 1 (Optimal Prices and Profits of the Hybrid Firm Propo-
sition): If there is no channel migration, a channel-pricing strategy generates 
a higher profit than a unified-pricing strategy for the hybrid firm. (Proofs of 
the first three propositions are given in Appendix 3.)
From P1, one learns that if channel migration is negligible, then the opti-
mal pricing strategy for a hybrid firm is a channel-pricing strategy. To maxi-
mize profit, hybrid firms should charge different prices optimized for each 
channel.
Pricing Model of Flexible Demand with Channel Migration
Next, the model is extended by assuming that consumers are able to move 
freely from off-line to on-line, and vice versa, based on their preferences and 
any incentives they may obtain to do this. Thus,
Hybrid Firm’s Demand Function 
 dh ′ = dt ′ + de ′ (5)
dt ′ = dt – (dt→e + dt→leave) and de ′ = de + dt→e with dt→e = f (CSW, pt , pe) and dt→leave = 
f (pt , pe),
where the demand level with the asterisk represents the demand, assuming 
channel migration, and CSW represents the customers’ channel-switching 
cost.
Specifically, dt→e represents the number of customers who change their pur-
chasing channel from traditional to on-line, and dt→leave represents the number 
of customers who decide not to buy the product and leave the firm. These 
numbers are determined by the customer’s channel-switching cost and the 
prices on the traditional and on-line channels. The channel interaction level in 
this section will be determined by two parameters, dt→e and dt→leave . The impact 
of the channel-migration level on the hybrid firm’s pricing strategy will be 
analyzed by investigating dt→e and dt→leave functions.
To do this, consumers are divided into two groups based on their channel 
preferences. traditional channel consumers are those who prefer the traditional 
channel to the on-line channel. on-line channel consumers have the opposite 
preferences. It is further assumed that every consumer has a single channel 
preference, not an attitude of indifference toward channel use. In addition, 
a consumer will not buy the same product from the traditional channel and 
the on-line channel simultaneously, even if given access to both channels for 
ordinary shopping.
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Consumers in the model are price-sensitive. Other factors may enter a 
consumer’s decision of channel choice, but textbooks treat price as the most 
important factor for consumer purchase decision-making [46, 85]. When a hy-
brid firm adopts a unified-pricing strategy across the channels, consumers will 
not have an incentive for moving from one channel to the other, because there 
will be no price differences from which to gain. However, when the hybrid firm 
adopts a channel-pricing strategy, some consumers may change their purchas-
ing channel to look for and benefit from a lower price. The model supports the 
analysis of consumer behavior under a channel-pricing strategy.
Other often-observed reasons for consumers to make a choice to switch 
channels include whether the firm offers other nonprice incentives [19], pro-
vides a different set of products [43], makes affinity program rewards available 
[25, 42, 82], faces a potential loss of private information due to on-line privacy 
concerns in marketing [86], or has implemented other means to reduce infor-
mation asymmetries and purchase transaction costs for the consumer [64]. 
Since the model does not consider these complications, the focus remains on 
the more basic channel-switching issues.
Let consumer i have two-dimensional heterogeneity in terms of channel-
switching cost qtSW and firm loyalty qiL. The channel-switching cost, as defined 
by Chen and Hitt, is any perceived inconvenience a consumer might experi-
ence when switching to another purchasing channel [17]. For example, to buy 
a product through the on-line channel, the traditional consumer may have to 
buy a new computer and bear several types of perceived transaction risks, 
such as privacy, phishing, and security. Many researchers have investigated 
the causes, consequences, and specifics of on-line transaction risks [59, 66]. Not 
all consumers have the same level of channel-switching costs, though. Rather, 
their channel-switching costs will vary. It is assumed that each consumer’s 
channel-switching cost is uniformly distributed over the range [0, 1]. A con-
sumer with a high channel-switching cost will be close to 1, and the consumer’s 
channel-switching cost also will be linearly proportional to its heterogeneous 
transaction-making preferences. The consumer channel-switching cost func-
tion for consumer i is represented with the constant γ as:
Consumer Channel-Switching Cost Function 
 
CSW i
SW
i
SWθ γθ( ) = .  (6)
The other consumer heterogeneity that will be treated by the model is firm 
loyalty. For present purposes, firm loyalty is defined as a favorable attitude 
toward the firm that results in repeat buying behavior by the consumer. This 
is a modified definition of brand loyalty, based on the definitions suggested by 
Assael and by Keller [3, 41]. A favorable attitude is usually established based 
on satisfactory previous experiences with the firm that lead the consumer to 
purchase the firm’s products again. A person who exhibits high firm loyalty 
would not be much affected by any source of inconvenience. For example, 
a consumer who has high firm loyalty for a specific type of product (e.g., 
Hewlett-Packard laser printers or Canon cameras) even though the transaction 
cost is high (indicating a strong source of inconvenience) will probably buy 
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the product from the company because the high loyalty mitigates the extent 
of the inconvenience caused by the high transaction cost.
In this model, a price difference can be the source of inconvenience for 
consumers [26]. The convenience of the on-line channel has been demon-
strated as one of the reasons why customers prefer the on-line channel to the 
physical channel [47, 51]. Consider a consumer who bought a product from 
the traditional channel at price pt. If it later becomes evident that the firm sells 
the same product at a lower price pe in the on-line channel, then the consumer 
may feel misled into having paid too high a purchase price, possibly resulting 
in sense of inconvenience for the purchase. In other words, a consumer with 
a preference for the traditional channel might feel bad on realizing that the 
price paid in the traditional channel was higher than the price available on the 
on-line channel. The consumer might even feel deceived by the firm. To avoid 
this, according to Srivastava and Lurie, many hybrid firms now offer a price-
matching guarantee across the on-line and off-line channels for consumers who 
cut across those segments [79]. This inconvenience occurs over a number of 
dimensions in addition to the channel chosen. For example, there recently were 
problems with temporal changes in the price of the Apple iPhone in which the 
vendor lowered the price from $599 to $399, setting off a storm of complaints 
from consumers who had queued up in a high-price frenzy to buy the new 
high-functionality mobile phone only two months earlier [14, 21].
A larger price difference will cause more inconvenience because it is the 
monetary value that the consumer could have saved in the case where the firm 
matched prices. In other words, the larger price difference between channels 
will lead the consumer to be more confused and to experience higher inconve-
nience. Since consumers are assumed to be price-sensitive, the price-difference 
parameter determines the level of inconvenience. However, the individual 
consumer’s loyalty level will determine whether there is inconvenience [16]. 
A consumer who has high firm loyalty will not be affected much by the price-
difference level, and will buy the product even though there is a large price 
difference between the channels. In business, price consistency is also one of 
the very important strategies for keeping high loyalty [53]. Thus, the inconve-
nience function of firm loyalty for consumer i, with a constant δ, is:
Consumer Channel-Switching Inconvenience Function
 
g p pi
L
t e i
Lθ δ θ( ) = − − .  (7)
Based on Equations (5) and (6), one can articulate how consumers react to 
the channel-pricing strategy of the hybrid firm. With channel pricing, a price-
sensitive traditional channel consumer has three options:
•	 Do not buy the product. If the consumer’s firm loyalty is low enough 
so that the inconvenience caused by the price difference g(q) is large 
enough to make the total utility negative, then the consumer will not 
buy the product. Here, the utility will be zero, and the consumer will 
not take any action.
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•	 Buy from the on-line channel. If the consumer’s firm loyalty is high and 
the channel-switching cost is low, the consumer will buy the product 
from the on-line channel out of a desire to buy the product at a lower 
price. The associated utility function is v0 + g(qiL) – (Pe + CSW (qiSW )).
•	 Buy from the traditional channel. If the consumer has high firm loyalty 
and also has a high channel-switching cost, the consumer will stay in 
the traditional channel, where the purchase will occur. The consum-
er’s utility function is v0 + g(qiL) – Pt .
These three choices for how the consumer buys and their conditions are 
summarized in Table 4.
Figure 4 presents the relative proportions of consumer purchasing behavior 
on and off the Internet. The large square is the total demand of the traditional 
channel, and the white area is the proportion of consumers who do not pur-
chase anything. The dotted gray area represents the consumers who stay and 
buy in the traditional channel, and the dark area represents consumers who 
change channels and purchase the product through the on-line channel. The 
proportion of consumers who do not buy anything is determined by customer 
loyalty q L*. Here, the heterogeneity level qiSW satisfies v0 + g(qiL) – Min(pt , pe , 
CSW (qiSW )) = 0. The proportion of consumers buying in the on-line channel is 
determined by the price sensitivity level qiSW, where the heterogeneity level 
qiSW satisfies CSW(qiSW ) = pt – pe.
Describing consumer behavior this way leads to several propositions. The 
next proposition discusses the impacts of firm loyalty and channel-switching 
costs on the profit of the hybrid firm, emphasizing the relative importance 
of one factor over the other. From these, one can assess the related channel-
migration level dt→e = b ⋅ dt , where b = f (qL*, qSW*) = qL* ⋅ qSW*, and dt→leave = a ⋅ dt , 
a = f (qL*) = 1 – qL*, which suggests the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (Impact of Firm Loyalty and Channel-Switching Cost 
Proposition): Changes in firm loyalty level have a greater effect on the profit 
of the channel-pricing hybrid firm than the same amount of change in the 
channel-switching cost level.
Disloyal customers leave the firm and do not buy the product at all, while 
price-sensitive customers with low channel-switching costs buy the product 
through the on-line channel. So the level of firm loyalty more critically affects 
the profit of the firm than does the channel-switching cost level. As a result, the 
firm would prefer to sell the product at a lower price than to lose the consumer 
to a competitor. For the retailer, channel-switching customers are preferred to 
disloyal customers who leave the firm.
The importance of firm loyalty has been discussed in a number of studies 
in marketing, economics, and business. In on-line consumer behavior studies, 
for example, loyalty and trust have been found to be the most important non-
price-related factors in determining consumer purchasing behavior and firm 
profitability [74, 78]. Next shown is the channel-pricing strategy condition for 
the hybrid firm when channel switching is possible for consumers:
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Proposition 3 (One-Purchase Short-Term Profit Optimization Propo-
sition). If 
1 1
2 1 2
+ −( ) + > +( )+( ) +( )θ θ θ θ
L SW L SW e
t
t e
e t t e
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R
k R R
R kR R kR
* * * * ,
a hybrid firm will have an incentive to use the channel-pricing strategy when 
channel switching is possible for consumers.
If firm loyalty and channel-switching costs are high and on-line demand 
comprises only a small portion of total demand, then the hybrid firm will not 
be compelled to implement a unified-pricing strategy. Instead, it may use a 
channel-pricing strategy for a while. The difficulty is that it is hard for a firm 
to achieve high loyalty from its customers. According to Forrester Research, 
53 percent of cross-channel customers say that price is more important than 
brand name when they make a purchase and also that channel-switching costs 
are decreasing as the penetration rate for the Internet retail has increased [55]. 
Not many firms are able to claim high loyalty from their customers, however. 
As a result, the hybrid firm may find that the potential benefits from imple-
menting a channel-pricing strategy will not be so attractive as the modeling 
results might suggest. The implication is that there will be more instances of 
firms implementing unified-pricing strategies, even in the short term.
It is now appropriate to consider a longer-term perspective that includes the 
possibility of consumers who may wish to make repeated purchases from a 
firm across either or both of the two channels discussed. Consider the following 
additional proposition that focuses on long-term profit optimization:
Proposition 4 (Repeated-Purchase Long-Term Profit Optimization 
Proposition): In a setting with repeated purchases by the consumer, a unified-
pricing strategy will always generate a higher level of profit than a channel-
pricing strategy, regardless of the size of the on-line channel. (The proof of 
the fourth proposition is available from the corresponding author.)
As long as the firm has a channel-pricing strategy, total demand will de-
crease by 1 – qL* and total profit will decrease by (1 – qL* )pt* + qL*(1 – qiSW )(pt* – pe* ) 
Figure 4. Customer Behavior with Different Channel Migration 
Conditions
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in the presence of repeated purchases by consumers. These losses continue 
until the prices of the two channels become equal, and eventually the firm 
will adopt a unified-pricing strategy. The resulting equilibrium price is lower 
than the equilibrium price of the unified-pricing firm, even with the possibil-
ity of repeated purchases by the consumer. This is because the total demand 
of the channel-pricing firm in equilibrium will be smaller than the demand 
of the unified-pricing firm. The higher equilibrium price always generates 
higher total profits. Because the equilibrium price of the unified-pricing firm 
is higher than that of the channel-pricing firm, we can easily predict that the 
total profit of the unified-pricing firm always will be higher than that of the 
channel-pricing firm. As a result of these observations, one may conclude that 
the optimal pricing strategy for the hybrid firm with channel migration is the 
unified-pricing strategy rather than the channel-pricing strategy.
Extended Results to Develop Hypotheses for Hybrid Firm’s 
Optimal Pricing Strategy
By comparing the analytical results from the models developed, one can de-
rive a couple of additional conjectures that will be formulated as hypotheses. 
They include:
Hypothesis 1 (Channel Interaction as Pricing Strategy Determinant 
Hypothesis): the higher the degree of channel migration observed, the 
higher will be the profits generated when a firm implements a unified-pricing 
strategy.
The theory also suggests that profits will be higher than what channel 
pricing produces in the long term. If there is channel migration, then unified 
pricing is the optimal pricing strategy for the hybrid firm, according to the 
results obtained by the modeling. Otherwise, a channel-pricing strategy will 
be the optimal approach for the hybrid firm. The next hypothesis characterizes 
the proportion of demand that a firm experiences in the on-line channel as a 
determinant of the hybrid firm’s price level:
Hypothesis 2 (On-Line Channel-to-Total Demand Proportion as 
Price-Level Determinant Hypothesis): the higher the firm’s proportion 
on-line relative to its total demand, the lower will be the equilibrium price 
under a unified-pricing strategy.
H2 will be evaluated by conducting a variety of statistical tests on mean 
price differences using related empirical data from 10 South Korean hybrid 
retailers. 
Empirical Analysis
The ideas outlined above will now be subjected to a quantitative analysis of 
South Korean Internet retailing data. The goal is to see whether it is possible 
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to establish some degree of concordance from the real-world data with the 
theoretical findings of the analytical models.
Observations of Pricing Strategies and On-Line Channel 
Demand of South Korean Hybrid Firms
The price levels of South Korean e-commerce firms were investigated to 
examine the On-Line Channel-to-Total Demand Proportion as Price-Level 
Determinant Hypothesis (H2). A comparison of the pricing strategies of differ-
ent types of firms made it possible to examine the role of the on-line channel 
proportion of the hybrid firms. According to the Korean National Statistical 
Office, there were 4,531 Internet shopping malls in South Korea as of December 
2006 [44]. Among these, 266 were multiproduct shopping malls like Amazon.
com, and others were more specialized retailers like CDNow.com. The annual-
ized transaction amount in 2006 totaled $13.46 billion.
Data were gathered from the top-10 on-line multi-shopping malls in South 
Korea. Firm rankings were obtained from Rankey.com, which provides Web 
site rankings based on different measures of consumer visit frequencies. For 
example, one relevant metric, the VisitRatio, is the relative number of visitors 
(in percentage terms) that a particular site in the multiproduct shopping mall 
category receives each week. Table 5 lists additional details on these firms.
The study found that there are three different types of hybrid firms in 
South Korea: TV home-shopping hybrid firms (HS hybrids) like QVC.com; 
department store hybrid firms (DS hybrids) like Sears.com; and department 
store and TV home-shopping hybrids (DS-HD hybrids). Among the top 10, 
there are four Internet-only firms, two TV home-shopping hybrid firms, three 
department store hybrid firms, and one combined department store and TV 
home-shopping hybrid firm (see table 5). Price data from these firms for the 
period September 24 to December 1, 2005, were collected for 102 products in 
various product categories.
Products for this study were selected from the best-selling product lists 
provided by Enuri.com, the most popular product- and price-comparison site 
in South Korea. Based on by-category transaction-amount statistics from the 
Korean National Statistical Office, in-house electronics, other electronics, and 
other nonelectronics were selected as the three categories for further study [44]. 
Detailed descriptions of the 102 selected products are reported in Table 6.
To determine the reliability of the price information, 5 percent of the obser-
vations from Enuri.com were double-checked with the actual target sites. This 
made it possible to determine whether the price-comparison site provided 
matching correct simultaneous price information. To avoid sampling biases, 
items sold by fewer than 7 of the 10 firms were eliminated. As a result, it was 
determined that each item was sold by an average of 8.4 stores.
The effect of the proportion of on-line channel demand to total demand 
for the hybrid firms was examined by comparing the prices of hybrid and 
Internet-only firms using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Paired data were 
analyzed when a normal distribution of the data was doubtful [22]. The test 
is a nonparametric alternative to the paired t-test for the case of two related 
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samples or repeated measurements on a single sample [22]. Because the prices 
in the sample vary from $30 to $1,300 and are not normally distributed, the as-
sumption of normality is not appropriate. As hypothesized, the Wilcoxon test 
results with 102 matched observations yielded a Z-score of –6.829 (p < 0.001 
based on a two-tailed test), supporting the observation that the hybrid firms 
had higher prices than the Internet-only firms (see table 7). The results of the 
paired t-test are provided in Appendix Tables A5-1 to A5-3 so that the reader 
can compare the different results. 
It was expected that higher prices would be observed for the hybrid firms 
based on the Optimal Prices and On-Line Channel Proportion of the Hybrid 
Firm Proposition (P2) and the On-Line Channel-to-Total Demand Proportion 
as Price-Level Determinant Hypothesis (H2). Because the Internet-only firms 
do not participate in the traditional retail channel, their prices are lower than 
those of the hybrid firms. Similar results were observed when the prices of 
Internet-only and hybrid firms in real-world shopping malls in the United 
States were compared, although full empirical results were not included to 
support the contention. Anecdotal evidence as of March 2009 suggests, for 
example, that Walmart.com was selling the iPod Nano, Blue (4th Generation) 
for $147.88, while Amazon.com was selling it for $133.95. Many instances of 
this kind of contrast in prices were seen.
Next, to compare the prices among hybrid firms, the hybrid firms were 
divided into the two groups discussed earlier: TV home-shopping hybrids 
(HS hybrids) and department store hybrids (DS hybrids). Hmall, a hybrid 
involving the TV home-shopping and department store channels (HS-DS 
hybrid), was excluded because its categories of hybridization are overlap-
ping. The department store hybrid firms have a much lower proportion of 
on-line channel demand in comparison to the home-shopping hybrid firms. 
On average, the department store hybrid firms had less than 2 percent of their 
demand from the on-line channel based on amount of sales, while the home 
shopping hybrids had 27 percent.
Table 6. Target Product Categories for 2005 Data.
In-house electronics  Other electronics  Other nonelectronics
Refrigerators 6 Mp3 players 6 Cosmetics 8
Washers 4 Camcorders 3 diapers 4
TVs 6 navigators 3 Baby foods 5
Kim-Chi refrigerators 4 electronic dictionaries 3 perfumes 4
Vacuum cleaners 3 pC monitors 2 Baby seats 2
Microwave ovens 3 Games 3 Bicycles 2
Air cleaners 2 Game-sticks 2 Chairs 2
Bidets 2 Laptop computers 7 Beds 2
humidifiers 1 printers 4 Tables 1
heaters 1 phones 1 Trade Mill 1
dishwashers 1   Snickers 2
Coffee makers 1
electronic shavers 1
 35  34  33
Note: Total products: 102. See Appendix Table A4 for transaction amounts by category.
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According to H2, DS hybrid firms were expected to have higher prices than 
HS hybrids and Internet-only firms, while HS hybrid firms would tend to have 
higher prices than Internet-only firms. To validate this hypothesis, another 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test was conducted for Internet-only firms versus DS 
hybrids, Internet-only firms versus HS hybrid firms, and finally DS hybrid 
firms versus HS hybrid firms. The results are reported in Table 8.
As expected, each comparison supported H2 and P2. Generally speaking, 
the on-line channel portion of total demand appears to determine the price 
level that the hybrid firms select, and a higher portion leads to the lower prices. 
Price differences were all significant at the 0.001 level.
Finally, a Friedman test (a nonparametric test that compares three or more 
paired groups) was conducted to compare the price levels of all the hybrid 
firm types at once [22]. Much the same as the parametric repeated measures 
(e.g., ANOVA), the Friedman test is a nonparametric statistical test used to 
detect differences in treatments across multiple test attempts. The procedure 
involves ranking each block together and considering the values of ranks by 
columns [22] (see table 9). The results show that firms with smaller on-line 
demand proportions, especially department store hybrids, charge higher 
prices in the on-line channel. Internet-only firms achieve all of their demand 
in the on-line channel, while the rates for the department hybrid firms and the 
home-shopping hybrid firms are only 2 percent and 27 percent, respectively. 
The price differences between the firm types should be ordered as pe < ph_DS (100 
percent – 2 percent = 98 percent), pe < ph_HS (100 percent – 27 percent = 73 per-
cent), and ph_HS < ph_DS (27 percent – 2 percent = 25 percent), as in Table 9.
Similar results were observed when Internet-only, home-shopping hybrid, 
and department store hybrid firm prices were compared with prices in real-
world shopping malls in the United States. As of March 2009, for example, 
an electronics product, the Olympus E420 10MP Digital SLR Camera, sold at 
Walmart.com for $549.84, while at QVC.com it went for $499.96 and at Amazon.
com for a little less at $498.00. These firms represent DS-hybrid, HS-hybrid, 
and Internet-only firms in the United States.
Finally, the consistency of the results across different product categories 
was examined by conducting category-based Friedman tests. As reported in 
Table 10, the results from each product category corroborate the finding that 
the prices of the hybrid firm are largely determined by the portion of the on-
line channel.
Table 7. Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test Results on Mean Price Differences 
Between Internet-Only and Hybrid Firms.
   Mean Sum of
Mean differences Ranks N rank ranks
Internet-only mean –  negative ranksa 84 53.70 4,511.00
hybrid mean positive ranksb 16 33.69 539.00
 Tiesc 2
 Total 102
Notes: a Internet-only < hybrid, b Internet-only > hybrid, c Internet-only = hybrid. Z-score = 6.829, asymptotic 
significance is p < 0.001 (for a two-tailed test).
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Conclusion
For the hybrid firm, managing pricing and demand across the traditional 
channel and the Internet channel is a significant strategic concern. If the chan-
nels overlap and consumers are free to move from the traditional channel to 
the on-line channel, then the firm should treat the two channels as one large 
channel with two types of customers. If the channels work independently, 
though, the firm should manage each one separately.
This research proposed two types of pricing models and demonstrated how 
one-way interaction between the on-line and off-line channels—from the tradi-
tional channel to the on-line channel—affects a hybrid firm’s pricing strategies. 
The first model assumes no (or negligible) channel migration. Since there will 
be few customers moving across the two channels, the demand levels of the 
on-line and off-line channels will be relatively rigid and stable. Under this 
assumption, charging different prices to on-line and off-line customers turns 
out to be the optimal pricing strategy compared to charging the same price 
across both channels. The second model assumes a certain level of channel 
migration from the traditional channel to the Internet channel. In this model, 
customers are able to move across the channels to pursue value based on their 
channel-switching costs and loyalty to a firm. A customer who has a low level 
of perceived cost for switching from the traditional channel to the Internet 
channel can easily change channel. A consumer who has high loyalty to the 
Table 9. Friedman Test Results for Mean Price Differences: Internet-
Only, Home-Shopping, and Department Store Hybrid Firms.
Firms Mean rank
dS hybrid 2.59
hS hybrid 1.97
Internet-only 1.43
Note: N = 99, c2 = 68.92. df = 2, p < 0.001.
Table 10. Friedman Test Results for Mean Price Differences: By Product 
Category.
Product category Firm Mean rank Test stat.
In-house electronics dS hybrid 2.66 N = 35, c2 = 26.80,
 hS hybrid 1.91 df = 2,
 Internet-only 1.43 p < 0.001
Other electronics dS hybrid 2.43 N = 34, c2 = 15.82, 
 hS hybrid 2.06 df = 2, 
 Internet-only 1.51 p < 0.001
Other nonelectronics dS hybrid 2.78 N = 30, c2 = 27.88, 
 hS hybrid 1.63 df = 2, 
 Internet-only 1.58 p < 0.001
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firm, though, may not wish to leave the firm and switch to another channel. 
Based on these settings, it was found that charging the same price in both the 
on-line and the off-line channel is the best pricing strategy for a hybrid firm 
from a long-term perspective. When the possibility of more flexible demand 
was considered, however, a different result was obtained from the first model, 
suggesting that it may not be beneficial to charge different prices across the 
different channels.
Based on the examination of several analytical models, four propositions 
were developed as well as two additional hypotheses of interest in this context. 
First, it was conjectured that the optimal pricing strategy of the hybrid firm is 
determined by the existence and extent of channel migration. Second, it was 
also conjectured that the price levels a hybrid firm sets will be determined by 
its on-line channel proportion. These conjectures were examined with data 
from 10 South Korean e-commerce firms. The investigation led to the conclu-
sion that the proposed analytical arguments are true. The second hypothesis 
was validated by comparing the prices of various types of hybrid firms. All 
the comparisons made on the basis of nonparametric paired mean difference 
tests offered consistent support.
These observations of South Korean e-commerce pricing strategies have 
implications for marketing and IS research. The results presented in the prior 
literature are not contradicted, but the analytical insights are deeper. First, 
evidence was found for the higher prices of hybrid firms, as has been shown 
in previous studies [1, 69]. It was also possible to reconcile these results with 
the size of the electronic channel portion of the hybrid firm’s business, as a 
determinant of its prices. Zettelmeyer analyzed the role of Internet size in 
on-line pricing [89]. His research was extended by specifying the portion of 
the Internet channel for each hybrid firm. Second, heterogeneous and diverse 
product categories represented by the firms in the data offer the potential for 
generalizability. Most of the prior research occurred within limited categories, 
such as cars and books [31, 61]. The present study covers 34 categories, from 
furniture to diapers to electronics. The large variety of categories represented 
by the data limits the potential biases that may arise with too few product types, 
and so this increases the generalizability of the present contribution. Finally, 
observations from the United States and South Korea were integrated. Most of 
the prior studies were limited to data from just one country, usually the United 
States [15, 69]. Moreover, the results show consistent results from these two 
countries, which both were early adopters of e-commerce. The United States is 
one of the largest markets in the world for on-line shopping, and South Korea 
continues to be a “digital mecca” for on-line shopping in Asia.
Overall, the results explain the current trends observed in the channel-
migration strategies of hybrid firms quite well. For example, Barnes and Noble 
initially motivated its customers to use the on-line channel by offering large 
discounts to reduce their transaction costs. However, after some “tipping 
point” is reached in terms of the size of the on-line channel demand that Barnes 
and Noble (and BN.com) face, the firm may consider adopting unified-pricing 
strategies to enhance long-term profits. What will be needed is a careful ef-
fort on the firm’s part to understand the impacts of channel migration in its 
business environment.
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Contributions
Overall, this research has several implications for theory and practice related 
to pricing strategies in the digital economy. It has been long thought that 
implementing a price-discrimination strategy generally increases the eco-
nomic welfare of a firm [84]. By charging different prices to customers with 
different levels of willingness-to-pay, firms are able to achieve the maximum 
level of profit from their target customer segments. This research explored 
the application of the theory of price discrimination in the first proposition. 
It showed why charging different prices on each channel (channel pricing, 
in other words) is optimal when there is a negligible level of channel migra-
tion. The following three propositions included the assumption of channel 
migration. For these, conditions were derived under which it appears that 
price discrimination across channels may not be the optimal strategy. When 
considerations of channel-switching cost and customer loyalty were added 
to the model, it was found that charging the same price—the unified-pricing 
strategy—actually may generate higher profit. For some time, it has been 
widely accepted in e-commerce that low menu and transaction costs tend to 
increase a firm’s pricing flexibility and accelerate the emergence of price dis-
crimination [29, 68]. This research has incorporated consideration of customer 
loyalty and channel-switching costs to explore the efficacy of implementing 
price discrimination by a hybrid firm. The results are also in harmony with 
prior theoretical findings on price matching [9].
Second, the relative size of the on-line channel is emphasized as a key de-
terminant of price level. E-commerce firm-pricing strategy is of interest due to 
the different pricing approaches that can be applied with the firm’s potential 
market power in mind. For a hybrid firm, protecting existing profits from the 
traditional channel is as important as the generation of new profits from the 
on-line channel. Unexpected price changes can endanger the firm’s profit, and 
yet a rigid pricing strategy also may cause the firm to become less effective 
than it should be in achieving high profitability [9]. In this research, it is sug-
gested that a firm’s pricing strategy should be made based on the proportion 
of sales that occur via the on-line channel. To analyze the pricing strategy 
of hybrid and Internet-only firms, other studies have used parameters such 
as transportation or transaction costs [18, 89]. These parameters are usually 
hard to conceptualize and estimate, though, because consumers experience 
different levels of transaction costs [36]. The present research employed the 
size of the on-line market as a proxy for penetration rate for e-commerce. The 
use of this much more readily measured parameter—the on-line proportion of 
sales—enabled a strong empirical validation of the propositions and enhanced 
the real-world applicability of the findings.
The last contribution is the conceptual separation of channel-switching 
costs from firm loyalty. The analyses considered them in one model to explain 
customer behavior in an integrated way. Both switching costs and loyalty 
have been recognized as important research issues in marketing, manage-
ment, and economics. But they are usually considered to be two sides of the 
same coin [49]. A consumer who has high loyalty toward a firm will face high 
switching costs, and vice versa. This research, however, made a distinction 
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between switching to another channel to purchase a product from the same 
firm and switching to another firm’s products. In the hybrid firm’s context, 
customers can switch to another channel with or without switching to consume 
another firm’s products. According to Mendelsohn et al. [55], 49 percent of 
multichannel shoppers make their purchases from a different off-line retailer 
than the one they use on-line to conduct their product search. This shows that 
the decision-making processes of firm selection and brand selection are inde-
pendent from channel selection. In the analysis of customer behaviors, these 
two different concepts were combined in one model to show their different 
roles in the functioning of customer behavior. So far as can be determined, 
this has never been done before in a modeling context like the one treated in 
the present research, whereas there are many studies that analyze only one 
of the concepts [52, 76].
Limitations and Future Research
The current study has several limitations that deserve discussion. First, the 
reader should recognize that the monopoly assumption employed in the model 
may not always be realistic. In many cases, competition between firms may 
need to be more fully considered. On the other hand, every firm has its own 
level of monopoly power in its industry, especially when the firm is among the 
leading companies. Thus, the model is more appropriate for application to the 
pricing strategies of large firms than small firms. The model can be extended 
by relaxing this assumption to more closely track the effects of competitive 
market structure.
Another limitation is that the model focuses on consumer behavior in the 
traditional channel. It emphasizes what happens with pricing strategy when 
a traditional retailing firm expands its distribution channels to include the 
Internet. The opposite situation is an appropriate one to consider also. Ex-
amples include Gateway Computer, a former Internet-only PC catalog store 
that later opened up proprietary retail stores and eventually partnered with 
Best Buy, Costco, Staples, Circuit City, and other leading retailers (and finally 
was acquired by Acer Computers of Taiwan in 2007). Going forward, the op-
portunity exists to further enrich the scenarios analyzed in the present study. 
Settings could be included in which the switching behavior across channels 
might begin with an analysis of primarily on-line shoppers, for example.
In addition, some of the limitations of the data set and data analysis should 
be mentioned. The use of data from South Korean e-commerce firms limits the 
generalizability of the findings. Although this group of firms is believed to 
provide a basis for establishing meaningful results, it cannot be claimed that 
the dynamics of competition in the South Korean market are the same as in 
other Asian countries, or in Europe or North America. Future research using 
U.S. or European firm data would facilitate comparisons of the main results 
across the different countries in those regions. Also, analysis of a larger data 
set will be necessary for more rigorous validation of the hypotheses. Since 
the present research only reported on product category-level price analysis, 
it would be appropriate in future research to conduct firm-level analysis to 
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gauge the impact of the proportion of the firm’s demand from the on-line 
channel in more detail.
Finally, other important criteria in purchase decision-making may have 
relevance. Although the study assumed that customers are price-sensitive 
and their behaviors are determined mainly by price, there are other factors 
that customers consider, such as convenience, product availability, and trust 
[6, 23]. Extensions of the model that consider these factors would enrich the 
managerial applicability of the research.
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Appendix 1
Table A1. Top-20 E-Retailers, August 1999 and January 2001.
   No. of
Rank E-retailer Buyers
August 1999
 1 Amazon.com 789,000
 2 Buy.com 314,000
 3 Barnesandnoble.com 289,000
 4 Ticketmaster.com 269,000
 5 planetRX.com 256,000
 6 Mothernature.com 241,000
 7 drugstore.com 191,000
 8 Gateway.com 167,000
 9 Cdnow.com 95,000
 10 SmarterKids.com 93,000
 11 Chipshot.com 80,000
 12 hallmark.com 80,000
 13 egghead.com 73,000
 14 yahoo.com 67,000
 15 OfficeMax.com 65,000
 16 etoys.com 57,000
 17 JCrew.com 52,000
 18 Spree.com 52,000
 19 Compaq.com 51,000
 20 TowerRecords.com 43,000
January 2001
 1 Amazon.com 2,330,000
 2 Barnesandnoble.com 638,000
 3 Ticketmaster.com 636,000
 4 half.com 567,000
 5 JCpenney.com 545,000
 6 drugstore.com 322,000
 7 Walmart.com 286,000
 8 Cdnow.com 263,000
 9 ShopIntuit.com 245,000
 10 Sears.com 215,000
 11 eToys.com 188,000
 12 Staples.com 186,000
 13 CyberRebate.com 185,000
 14 Spiegel.com 159,000
 15 Buy.com 153,000
 16 JCrew.com 136,000
 17 VictoriasSecret.com 133,000
 18 Gap.com 122,000
 19 Oldnavy.com 122,000
 20 1800Flowers.com 115,000
Sources: [70, 71]. Buyer-related data are estimates by the source, not actual numbers representing home 
users.
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Appendix 3. Proofs of Main Propositions
A. Proof of Proposition 1 (Optimal Prices and Profits of 
Hybrid Firm Proposition)
To prove p*h_u < p*h_c = p*e_c + p*t_c,
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A-1. Proof of Proposition 1 with Variable and Fixed Costs 
Considered
In the case of channel-pricing strategy, the price and profit levels are as 
follows:
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In the case of unified-pricing strategy, the contrasting price and profit levels 
are: 
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From these relations, one can see that the unified-pricing strategy is a special 
subset of channel-pricing strategy for the separate channels. In other words, in 
the set of various separate pricing strategies (pt , pe), by assigning a restrictive 
condition pt = pe, one unified-pricing strategy can be derived based on 
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So if there is no channel migration, regardless of the value of variable and 
fixed costs in the two channels, the profit of the hybrid firm with a separate 
channel strategy will be greater than or equal to the profit associated with 
the unified-pricing strategy. The two profits will be the same only when ph_u 
is equal to pt_c = pe_c. Q.E.D.
With regard to the other results from Propositions 2 to 4, the fixed costs 
need not be considered. When the variable costs are greater in the traditional 
channel than in the electronic channel, the benefit of separate pricing will be 
greater if this difference is considered. However, the results from Propositions 2 
to 4 would not be affected because the relative changes will not influence the 
direction of the signs of the first-order conditions or the relative magnitudes 
of the sums of the infinite series of profits.
B. Proof of Proposition 2 (Impact of Firm Loyalty and 
Channel-Switching Cost Proposition)
We define Dph = pht+1 – pht for any time t. We also define, 
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Therefore, with qSW* < 1 and (1 – Re /Rt ) < 1, it is known that qSW*(1 – Re /Rt ) < 1 
will be true. Q.E.D.
C . Proof of Proposition 3 (One-Purchase Short-Term  
Profit-Optimization Proposition)
We define ph_ctotaL as the total profit of the channel-pricing hybrid firm when 
it is able to adjust its price in a second period after observing its customers’ 
responses to its previous price in the first period. The total profit of the uni-
fied-pricing hybrid firm in a similar setting is given by ph_utotaL. From the Firm 
Loyalty and Channel-Switching Cost Proposition (P2), it is known that 
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the firm will have an incentive to adopt the channel-pricing strategy when 
adjusting the first period price is possible in the second period. Q.E.D.
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Appendix 5. Paired t-Test Results
To examine the effect of the proportion of on-line channel demand to the total 
demand for the hybrid firms, a paired mean difference one-tailed t-test was 
conducted to compare the prices of hybrid and Internet-only firms. The hybrid 
firms had higher prices than the Internet-only firms. See Table A5-1.
The higher prices of the hybrid firms were expected based on the Optimal 
Prices and On-line Channel Proportion of the Hybrid Firm Proposition (P2) 
and the On-line Channel-to-Total Demand Proportion as Price Level Deter-
minant Hypothesis (H2). Because the Internet-only firms do not participate 
in the traditional retail channel, their prices are lower than the prices of the 
hybrid firms.
Next, the top-ranking firms were selected and their prices were compared: 
Interpark and DnShop representing the Internet-only retailers; GSeshop and 
CJmall representing the hybrid firms. Those four firms covered 58 percent of 
the total VisitRatio of the multi-shopping mall category. Since the top-ranking 
firms are able to achieve operational economies of scale based on the higher 
level of competition they experience, their prices were expected to be closer to 
their marginal costs. The results in Table A5-2 show that Internet-only firms’ 
prices were about 2.1 percent less (about $10, on average), while the hybrid 
firms’ prices were lower by 1.2 percent (or about $6). The lesser difference 
for the most popular hybrid firms may indicate their relative inflexibility in 
making price adjustments due to their operations in the traditional channel 
in parallel with the Internet channel. This is likely to be the case because the 
traditional channel is still the main source of profit for hybrid firms. So this 
result is consistent with the Optimal Prices and On-line Channel Proportion of 
Table A5-1. t-Test Results for Mean Price Differences Between  
Internet-Only and Hybrid Firms.
Internet-only  Hybrid
mean mean Result Difference Signif.
492.07 511.28 pe < ph 19.21 0.001
Notes: pe = on-line prices for Internet-only firms. ph = on-line prices for hybrid firms. Mean prices are denomi-
nated in U.S. dollars.
Table A5-2. t-Test Results on the Mean Price Differences of the  
Top-Ranking Firms.
Internet-only  Hybrid
firm mean mean Result Difference Signif.
481.67 505.29 pe < ph 23.62 0.001
Notes: pe = on-line prices for Internet-only firms. ph = on-line prices for hybrid firms. Mean prices are ex-
pressed in U.S. dollars.
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the Hybrid Firm Proposition (P2) and the On-line Channel-to-Total Demand 
Proportion as Price-Level Determinant Hypothesis (H2). 
Finally, as with the other tests that were conducted and discussed, the prices 
of the hybrid firms were compared (see Table A5-3). The approach was to 
create two groups: TV home-shopping hybrids (HS hybrids) and department 
store hybrids (DS hybrids). Hmall, a hybrid involving the TV home-shopping 
and department store channels (HS-DS hybrids), was again omitted. Next, 
t-tests were conducted for mean differences with three types of on-line firms: 
Internet-only and HS and DS hybrids. The department store hybrid firms had 
a much lower proportion of on-line channel than the home-shopping hybrid 
firms. On average, the department store hybrid firms had less than 2 percent 
of their demand from the on-line channel based on amount of sales, while 
the home-shopping hybrids had 27 percent. The t-test results show that firms 
with smaller on-line demand proportions relative to total demand, especially 
department store hybrids, charge higher prices in the on-line channel.
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Table A5-3. t-Test Results for Mean Price Differences: Internet-Only, 
Home-Shopping, and Department Store Hybrid Firms.
Internet- HS DS
only hybrid hybrid Result Difference Signif.
— 522.62 530.54 ph_HS < ph_DS  7.92 0.005
506.39 — 530.54 pe < ph_DS 24.25 0.000
492.07 508.09 — pe < ph_HS 16.02 0.003
Notes: ph_HS = prices at TV home-shopping hybrid firms. ph_DS = prices at department store hybrid firms. 
pe = price at Internet-only retailers.
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